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Abstract
Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to identify factors associated with the presence and use of internal audit functions
(IAFs) at US colleges and universities, as well as their relationship with financial reporting quality and federal
grant outcomes.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a combination of publicly available and manually collected data, this paper uses a two-stage model to
examine both the factors associated with the use of IAFs within US institutions of higher education and the
consequences therein.

Findings

Results indicate that institutions with larger enrollments and endowments, those that receive public funding and
those that have an audit committee are more likely to maintain an IAF. Findings also suggest that the presence
of an IAF is negatively associated with reported material weaknesses for major programs at significant levels.
Finally, the presence of an IAF is found to have a positive and significant association with federal grants received
by the institution, with an even stronger association for IAFs that perform grant-specific procedures.

Originality/value

The study’s findings provide the first large-sample quantitative insights on IAF work within US colleges and
universities. Results should be of interest to college/university leadership as they attempt to improve financial
reporting quality and grant outcomes, as well as external stakeholders looking to evaluate whether institutions
are acting as good stewards over resources. Additionally, the Institute of Internal Auditors may find the results
helpful when promoting the profession.
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Introduction
The importance of the internal audit function (IAF) within US publicly-traded companies is well-documented in
prior literature (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2004; Prawitt et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Ege,
2015). The Institute of Internal Auditors (The IIA, 1999) describes internal auditing as:
[…] an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an
organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic,
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and
governance processes.
Despite this, little research has examined the role of the IAF outside of publicly-traded companies (Coupland,
1993) in the USA aside from municipal governments (Peterson, 2014; DeSimone, 2020), and to the authors’
knowledge very little research has examined the role and impact of IAFs within US colleges and universities.
Using a unique set of publicly available and hand-collected data, this study aims to examine both the
determinants of use of IAFs in US institutions of higher learning (i.e. colleges and universities) and the IAF’s
impact on financial reporting quality and federal grant receipts therein.
An empirical examination of the IAF’s contributions within US institutions of higher education is important for
several reasons. First, these institutions fall under different governance paradigms than publicly traded
organizations that are the focus of most prior literature (Christopher, 2012b). Given that IAFs for colleges and
universities are likely to be less mature than those in publicly traded firms (van Gils, 2012), a more
comprehensive understanding of IAFs in this sector is timely. More importantly, institutions of higher education
vary significantly in terms of size, mission, funding sources and scope of operations (Anderson et al.,
2010). Therefore, the stakeholders, laws and regulatory requirements are likely different from both publicly
traded companies and other nonprofits. One consequence is that internal auditors within US colleges and
universities have varying responsibilities that may involve both assurance and/or consultancy over a wide array

of topics ranging from financial reporting to grant funding. We use a unique data set that allows for direct
evaluation of outcomes that should be impacted by IAFs in higher education.
We use a two-stage model to first examine factors associated with the presence and use of IAFs in these
institutions, and second, how IAFs influence internal control material weaknesses (over both financial reporting
and federal programs) and federal grant outcomes therein. Using observations from 400 colleges and
universities between 2004 and 2017 (based on the largest 250 institutions by either endowment or
undergraduate enrollment in 2016), we find that large (based on endowment and enrollment) public institutions
and those that have an audit committee (AC) are more likely to maintain an IAF. These findings imply that
institutions of higher learning with more resources are likely to use an IAF to provide oversight.
Our results first indicate that the presence of an IAF is negatively associated with reported material weaknesses
for major programs at significant levels, but not associated with reported weaknesses in controls over financial
reporting. One interpretation of this result is that IAFs focus their efforts on compliance with federal rules over
major programs, and that their oversight strengthens the reporting system in a way that mitigates internal
control weaknesses. Furthermore, we find that the presence of an IAF has a positive and significant association
with federal grants received by the institution, especially when the institution performs grant-oriented
procedures. We attribute this result to improved oversight over grant dollars when there is an active IAF,
possibly because of greater attention to detail during the grant application process or higher evaluations of
stewardship by institutions making granting decisions via fewer internal control issues.
We contribute to the literature on accounting in higher education in at least three ways. First, we are first to
examine the IAF’s role in higher education on a quantitative macro level. Our findings provide an important
benchmark for college/university leadership looking to determine how their approach to internal audit
compares with peer institutions. Second, by documenting associations between IAF existence and financial
reporting outcomes, we illustrate how internal audit can facilitate the sharing of high-quality information with
stakeholders. Third, our findings regarding grant funding highlight that the benefits of IAFs in higher education
extend beyond financial reporting, reinforcing the notion that these IAFs perform a wide variety of value-added
services. This is important because internal audit helps increase levels of governance
transparency (Archambeault et al., 2008) and improve grant processes, which should be useful amidst high
levels of competition for grant dollars (Howard and Laird, 2013).
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. We first present a brief background on accounting and
internal audit for institutions of higher learning, followed by our hypotheses. Next, is a description of our
research design, followed by our results. The last section provides a summary and concluding remarks.

Background and hypotheses
Background

Internal auditors within US colleges and universities perform a wide variety of procedures, which can involve
both assurance and/or consultancy work. This includes but is not limited to financial, risk management, advisory,
compliance (assets, grants, purchasing and academics) and information technology work. Some
colleges/universities have large system-wide or individual campus IAFs, some maintain one person IAFs, while
others outsource IAF activities to vendors (e.g. Proviti [1]) or co-source them through consortiums (e.g. The
Boston Consortium [2]).
In performing financial assurance work internal auditors within colleges/universities assist with accounting
standard compliance and report findings to leadership. This is done through assessment of policies and

procedures and by providing ideas to improve internal controls and financial systems and reporting. In summary
these IAFs:
Review internal controls, processes, and systems to identify systemic weaknesses and propose
improvements and Internal auditors assess the adequacy of corporate governance and the control
environment; the effectiveness of processes to identify, assess, and manage risks; the assurance
provided by control policies, procedures, and activities; and the completeness and accuracy of
information and communication systems and practices (The IIA, 2012).
Regarding grants, the federal government historically has been the largest sponsor of research activities at US
institutions of higher education, contributing around $39bn or 54% of the money spent on research by these
institutions in 2016 (NSF, 2017) [3]. With federally funded research grants, the principal investigator (researcher)
is responsible for conducting and completing the technical (research) portion of the project, while the
college/university is responsible for the project adhering to the regulations and policies of the federal funding
source. Additionally, cost accounting principles and audit requirements for higher education federal award
grantees are established by the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and are detailed in The Uniform
Administrative Requirements (OMB, 2014a). The proposal and award policies are often long and detailed, such
as the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) 198 page Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide, which
covers proposal preparation and submission guidelines, as well as the award, administration and monitoring of
grants (NSF, 2019). Additionally, the NSF’s Office of the Inspector General (NSF-OIG) periodically conducts audits
of grantee internal controls related to grants, and in its 2016 semi-annual report to Congress noted a total of
more than $5.5m in questioned costs over 13 audits during 2011-2015. The NSF-OIG also stated:
[…] at 32 of the 42 awardees with findings, auditors reported 65 material weaknesses and/or significant
deficiencies in internal control over compliance, representing more than 80 % of findings identified
during the period, calling into question the awardees’ ability to provide effective stewardship over
federal funds (NSF-OIG, 2016).
Recent stories in the press highlight the importance of audits related to federal grants, and the costs of noncompliance. During a 2010 visit to Duke University, an NSF-OIG auditor stated “scientific excellence is no longer
enough […] financial and administrative excellence are now required” (Mock, 2002). In 2015, the University of
Florida was ordered to pay the US$19.875m to settle allegations that it improperly charged salary and
administrative costs to hundreds of federal grants from the US Department of Health and Human Services from
2005-2010 (US DOJ, 2015). Internal auditors help their institutions with grant compliance by creating and/or
auditing procedures and internal controls that cover these administrative aspects of externally sponsored
projects for both pre- and post-award activities, and as such, can contribute to the success of obtaining and
retaining grants.

Literature review

Colleges and universities in the USA may be state or privately supported. Stakeholders that provide funding to
these institutions include state governments, taxpayers, private donors, tuition payers, students and potential
employers of graduates. Both public and private institutions of higher education routinely obtain federal grants
for research (Montondon and Fischer, 1999). As discussed previously, these federal grants often comprise a
large portion of funding for research conducted within higher education institutions, and has roughly doubled to
almost $40bn since 2000 (NSF, 2017) [4].
Gordon et al. (2002) examine the factors associated with service efforts and accomplishments (SEA) reporting
disclosure levels [5] for both public and private institutions of higher learning without considering internal audit,
and find that disclosure levels are significantly higher for large institutions (based on assets). Gordon and Fischer

(2008) find higher levels of SEA reporting for larger institutions, those with greater debt levels and those
providing more advanced degrees. Furthermore, Behn et al. (2010) suggest that greater levels of transparency
for entities of higher education compared to other nonprofit organizations is because of familiarity with scrutiny
by stakeholders.
Research regarding internal audit in higher education is limited, especially in the USA Montondon and Fischer
(1999) examine the work of IAFs in US institutions of higher education and find that they focus efforts on
compliance and financial audits, but do not perform financial or program audits of academic subunits.
Additionally, Anderson et al. (2010) propose a model to effectively size IAFs in US colleges and universities,
although this research does not empirically examine the impact of IAF work. However, we expect that IAFs
within the USA to provide benefits to colleges/universities at least as much as their international counterparts.
This is because prior research indicates that IAF development is more advanced in Anglo-Saxon countries
primarily because of the longer IAF history therein (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011).
Outside the USA, some studies have examined the use and work of IAFs within institutions of higher
education. Lundquist (1997) suggests that internal auditors can make positive contributions within total quality
management in higher education in Sweden. Zakaria et al. (2006) find that IAFs are more prevalent and have a
broader scope within public institutions of higher education than their private counterparts. Arena
(2013) examines internal audit in Italian universities and finds a varying degree of IAF usage therein, as well as a
wide range of processes audited by IAFs. Using a case study approach, Mihret and Yimsaw (2007) suggest that
the IAF within an Ethiopian institution of higher education is not highly effective. Sari et al. (2017), using survey
data from universities in Indonesia, find that IAFs do not effectively improve internal control systems because
they lack the organizational influence to do so.
Blackmore (2004) suggests that internal academic audit inspection and quality control processes in the UK are
close to the ISO 9000 guidelines for auditing quality management systems but also sometimes fall short in the
areas of quality assurance and total quality management. Using survey data from a sample of Australian
university vice-chancellors, Christopher (2012a) finds that IAFs are viewed as an important part of corporate
governance by monitoring controls effectively, but some may lack the skills necessary to monitor management
and conduct both operational and performance audits of educational institutions. Christopher (2012b) develops
a model of the factors that influence corporate governance mechanisms, including internal auditing, in
Australian public universities. Christopher (2015) finds that IAFs in public Australian universities operate under
flexible structural and functional arrangements (sufficient organizational support, IAF activities and relationship
with management) that allow them to enhance governance in their respective institutions. Finally, Ntim et
al. (2017) examine whether internal governance structures influence voluntary disclosures in UK higher
education institutions, but only considers IAF resources and no other IAF-related variables. Thus, our research
fills a gap by examining the effectiveness of IAFs in institutions of higher education, specifically in the USA, as
there exists variability internationally therein. Additionally, we take a more quantitative macro approach to
examine IAFs within institutions of higher education than most prior studies, which focus on case studies or
contain more limited samples.

Hypotheses

Recently, public universities have increasingly followed market-based public administration and corporate
managerialism (Christopher, 2012a; Kezar and Eckel, 2004; Parker, 2011). This includes the shift to a more
centralized and structured approach to governance (Kezar, 2005), which closely resembles that of the private
sector. To assist higher education administration and trustees in ensuring effective governance, the framework
under the corporate and new public management structure provides for a number of control mechanisms
including an independent IAF. Within colleges and universities, IAFs assist administrators by creating, updating,

reviewing and reporting on internal controls related to governance and providing feedback therein (Christopher,
2012a). This includes controls related to both the financial reporting and the grant processes.
The Single Audit Act of 1984 (United States Congress, 1984) and Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 (United
States Congress, 1996) require local governments, non-profit organizations or institutions of higher education
receiving certain levels of federal funding to undergo a single audit (previously called A-133 audit) [6]. Single
audits ensure compliance with rules regarding the use of federal funds and whether appropriate internal
controls are in place therein per the US OMB (OMB, 2014a). The objectives of single audits are to evaluate
whether entities that receive significant federal funding comply with laws, regulations and the provisions of
contract and grant agreements and maintain internal control to provide reasonable assurance of
compliance (OMB, 2003). Institutions that spend $750,000 or more in federal funds must undergo a financial
statement audit (OMB, 2014a). This audit includes external auditor assessment of whether internal controls over
financial reporting are designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting
and the preparation of financial statements per Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller
General of the USA. When internal controls are deemed inadequate enough to create a reasonable possibility of
a material misstatement, material weaknesses [7] are noted in audit reports for both single audits and financial
statement audits (U.S. GAO, 2011).
Prior research suggests a positive relationship between the use of the IAF and financial reporting quality in
publicly-traded companies (Prawitt et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Ege, 2015) [8]. In the non-profit setting, using a
sample of US municipalities, Peterson (2014) finds no relationship between the presence of an IAF in
municipalities and audit reportable conditions. DeSimone (2020) finds a significant positive relationship between
the presence of an IAF and reported financial statement internal control issues (significant deficiencies) in a
sample of US municipalities with populations over 100,000. DeSimone (2020) also indicates a significant negative
association between the presence of an IAF and financial statement restatements. The author posits that these
results indicate that IAFs in the public sector are able to identify and ensure proper reporting of these issues and
prevent related financial statement errors, but lack the resources to implement the controls to completely
mitigate them. Thus, IAFs demonstrate the ability to help improve financial reporting quality through
transparency, even when they lack appropriate resources for complete mitigation therein.
If IAFs improve an institution’s governance structure in a way that strengthens internal controls, one
consequence should be an inverse association between IAFs and internal control weaknesses. However, IAFs in
higher education may not be as mature as publicly-traded companies, as they are often younger and have less
funding (Gordon and Fischer, 1996; Montondon and Fischer, 1999; The IIA, 2009). Additionally,
universities/colleges are generally not required to follow the provisions of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley
(United States Congress, 2002) [9]. Thus, one consequence could be a positive relationship between IAF
existence and internal control weaknesses. This is because IAFs may help improve the transparency of financial
reporting by helping to properly disclose internal control weaknesses, but may not have the appropriate time or
resources for remediation or their parent institution may fail to act on IAF recommendations.
The NSF-OIG has noted this scenario in numerous audit reports of grantee institutions. For example, in an audit
of Cornell University’s effort certification system (used to validate salaries and wages charged NSF grants), the
NSF-OIG found that 19% of reviewed salaries were inadequately certified. This was despite the fact that Cornell’s
IAF identified the same weakness two years prior to the NSF-OIG audit (NSF-OIG, 2009a). The NSF-OIG also
reported in 2009:
Georgia Tech has not developed adequate oversight processes for the review of prospective workload
changes and cost transfers even though the issue of inadequate cost transfer justifications has been

identified with respect to the area of cost transfers since 2004 by Georgia Tech’s own internal audit
function (NSF-OIG, 2009)
Additionally, some prior research (Lopez and Peters, 2010) finds that large Certified Public Accountant firms are
more likely to issue control exceptions than are governmental and local Certified Public Accountant firms. The
authors point to the abundance of literature suggesting that public firms provide higher quality audits than
governmental auditors, and that audit firm size is positively associated with audit quality. Therefore, given the
mixed results of prior literature and resulting expectations therein, we state our first hypothesis in the null as
follows:
H1. The presence of an IAF will be independent of internal control material weaknesses.
Next, the benefits of IAFs to institutions of higher education are not limited to financial reporting, as they also
may be an integral participant in the grant process of their respective institutions. The Uniform Administrative
Requirements (OMB, 2014a) detail the overarching accounting principles and audit requirements, while also
providing the basis for determining applicable costs for federal award grantees. These requirements can be
daunting on their own, plus each grant sponsor also has specific requirements. For example, pre-grant policies
and procedures for the submission of proposals may require the use of specific application forms or electronic
web-based systems. This may also include detailed instructions regarding page limitations on narrative sections,
biographical sketches/CVs, budgets, budget justifications. Applications that do not conform to these
requirements may jeopardize the proposal’s success.
The researcher is responsible and accountable for the sponsored project and the college/university provides the
infrastructure (generally administered through a sponsored research department) in which the investigator
conducts the project. Thus, the institution provides guidance and support with regard to the development and
administration of externally funded sponsored projects, which includes but is not limited to the definition of
roles and responsibilities regarding administration and compliance and to answer questions about institutional
policies and procedures, as well as federal and other regulations. Pre-award, the institution helps faculty locate
and apply for external funding (searches, proposal and budget development, reading and interpreting
regulations and compliance guidelines and proposal submissions). Post-award the institution may help with
award negotiation, compliance with federal rules and regulations, assisting with technical report completion and
any modifications.
Internal auditors within colleges/universities are in a unique position to assist with advanced and value-added
activities (Bou-Raad, 2000; Nagy and Cenker, 2002; The IIA, 2013), such as grants. First, they have an innate
knowledge of the institution’s purpose, employees and its environment. Second, internal auditors are trained to
assess policies and procedures, provide ways to improve operations and make recommendations to enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of institutional operations. Finally, they regularly communicate findings and
suggestions for improvements to relevant decision-makers, and assist with implementation therein (Gramling et
al., 2004; Nagy and Cenker, 2002; The IIA, 2013).
Specific to the grant process, IAFs perform grant compliance auditing for their institutions. This includes
validation that expenses charged to a grant are allocable, allowable and reasonable and verification that specific
compliance standards are upheld (export controls, hazardous materials, human subject management, IRB
protocol, etc.). This “grant compliance auditing” provides an assessment of compliance with federal and
university guidelines to determine problem areas. Additionally, IAFs examine the controls and processes in place
that handle a large number/scope of grants to verify that these processes will meet compliance/legal
requirements. This includes collaboration with research administrators around controls in place (first layer of
defense) to strengthen the overall control environment. Additionally, IAFs perform university wide

controls/processing auditing, which involves controls that reside in pre/post-award central offices (second layer
of defense) to ensure they are operating appropriately. These controls generally cover three main areas,
namely, management responsibility (application timing, composition, budgeting, financial reporting), reporting
requirements (research progress, personnel, time and effort) and risk assessment (personnel, time and effort,
costs, policies and procedures, compliance) (Evans and Roy, 2012). Finally, some IAFs use sophisticated data
analysis tools to ensure conformance with compliance and legal regulations (primarily for expenses) [10].
In 2006, the University of Florida internal audit department discovered a weakness within the accounting system
under which researchers confirm the allocation of salaries charged to research grants (Magoc, 2015). However,
the university failed to begin to remedy this weakness until 2007, and ultimately had to settle litigation and pay
back $19.8m in research grants to the US Department of Health and Human Services (Magoc, 2015; US DOJ,
2015). Despite this example, many audit reports published by the NSF-OIG find that grantee institutions with
IAFs generally have well-established grant management systems, with some exceptions (NSF-OIG,
2006;2008; 2009a; 2009b) [11]. Also, many institutions publicly disclose the results of their IAF’s audits of grants
( UTEP, 2016; University of Washington Department of Audits, 2007; Minnesota State Colleges and Universities
Office of Internal Auditing, 2016) (internal control weakness). Thus, we expect that IAFs are able to apply both
their institutional and compliance knowledge to help create processes and controls that streamline and make
the grant process more efficient and effective and/or that IAF oversight control provides assurance to funders,
which leads to more positive granting decisions. Thus, we present our second hypothesis:
H2. The presence of an IAF will be associated with higher amounts of federal grant funding.

Research design and results
Data and summary statistics

We begin our analysis based on the 1,570 institutions of higher education that awarded bachelor’s degrees in
the USA using data from the Integrated Post-secondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provided by the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). To facilitate both data availability and comparability, we focus on the
largest 250 institutions in terms of either undergraduate enrollment or endowment value in 2016. This
restriction resulted in 400 unique institutions that are the focus of our analysis between 2004 and 2017 [12]. We
hand collect information on IAFs and ACs for sample institutions from websites and by contacting institutions via
e-mail and/or phone when information is not available online. Most institutional characteristics such as
endowment value and enrollment also come from IPEDS, while the highest degree awarded details are from the
Carnegie classification of institutions of higher education. Finally, we merge in details from audit analytics to
identify internal control weaknesses and select financial information. Table 1 outlines our sample selection
procedures, which result in 3,433 institution-years for the internal control model and 4,952 for the federal
grants model.

Determinants of internal audit functions

Given that maintaining an IAF is voluntary for non-profit organizations such as institutions of higher education,
there is the risk that selection bias influences any results. Therefore, we begin our analysis with a model
designed to assess the likelihood an institution maintains an IAF as part of a Heckman (1979) two-stage
procedure. We use the following probit specification:

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+ 𝛼𝛼3 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛼𝛼6 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, + 𝛼𝛼9 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛼𝛼10 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖, + 𝛼𝛼11 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+∑𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + ∑𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗

Where IAF is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions with an IAF in place [13]. The control
variables for all models are derived from the internal audit and education streams of literature streams and are
presented in the Appendix. Endowment represents the total logged endowment of the institution while Total
enrollment represents the total logged number of undergraduate students enrolled. These are used as proxies
for institution size, as prior research finds that the presence of an IAF is often a resource allocation
decision (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2012; Christopher, 2012a, 2012b). Graduate
percentage is the fraction of total enrollment that are graduate students and is a proxy for research intensity
(Dundar and Lewis, 1998).
Private colleges and universities are not subject to the electoral control, which holds the government
accountable, while public institutions have a unique relationship to state government through funding and their
relationship with the state auditor (Gordon et al., 2002). Prior research finds that a larger internal audit
department budget for private universities despite employing fewer people than the public
universities (Montondon and Fischer, 1999) and that public colleges and universities disclose financial
information to a greater extent than private ones (Gordon et al., 2002). Public versus private is also used as a
control variable in higher education research that examines research grant funding and productivity (Dundar
and Lewis, 1998; Payne, 2001; Ali et al., 2010). Thus, Public indicates if an institution is public (coded as 1) or
private (coded as 0). College denotes whether an institution is organized into a single college encompassing all
students (coded as 1) or a university (coded as 0) where operations are organized into separate colleges.
We use several additional measures to control for factors associated with research
intensity. Doctoral and Masters are indicator variables equal to 1 (0 otherwise) to indicate the highest degree
awarded at a given institution. Land grant identifies whether an institution is designated to receive the benefits
of the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890, while Hospital is an indicator denoting whether the institution maintains
an independent hospital (1 yes, 0 no).
Religious is an indicator equal to 1 for institutions with a religious affiliation, and Urban is an indicator equal to 1
(0 otherwise) for institutions with an urban locale code as defined by the NCES. Audit committee is an indicator
equal to 1 (0 otherwise) to denote institutions that maintain an active AC, which is a separate source of
governance. Finally, YearFE represents fiscal year fixed effects while StateFE represents the state where the
institution resides.

Consequences of internal audit functions

We propose the following specification to test for associations between IAFs in higher education and internal
control material weaknesses.

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+𝛼𝛼5 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
+𝛼𝛼8 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼10 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+𝛼𝛼11 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼13 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+𝛼𝛼14 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + ∑𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗

Where internal control weakness (ICW) represents either a material weakness over:
•
•

the financial statements in general or
major programs (Petrovits et al., 2011).

IAF type considers the nature of internal audit procedures and is coded as 1 if the IAF performs specific financial
reporting (IAF financial work) or grant-oriented (IAF grant work) procedures (0 otherwise) [14]. Debt
ratio represents the ratio of debt to total assets, and captures the extent of reliance on leverage. Big4
auditor indicates if the institution uses a Big 4 auditor (1) or not (0), and is a proxy for audit quality. Low risk
audit denotes whether the year’s audit is characterized by the external auditor as low risk, implying that the
auditors expect few exceptions to arise during fieldwork (Petrovits et al., 2011). Lambda is the inverse Mills from
the first stage of our Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure based on equation (1). All other variables are defined
previously.
We propose the following specification to test for associations between IAFs in higher education and federal
grant funding.
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+𝛼𝛼4 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+𝛼𝛼6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
+𝛼𝛼9 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼10 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼11 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+𝛼𝛼12 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + ∑𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 + ∑𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗

Where Federal Grants represents the logged total dollar amount of federal grant money received by the
college/university. All other variables are as defined previously. Our controls include all variables considered in
the higher education literature regarding research productivity (Dundar and Lewis, 1998; Payne, 2001; Ali et al.,
2010). These studies use various proxies to control for institution size, graduate student percentage,
public/private, research productivity and the presence of a medical school. Note that all continuous variables
are windsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

Results
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the institutions in our sample. Panel A is for the entire sample, which
highlights that 67% of institution-years have an IAF, and that 45% and 37% of institution-years involve an IAF
that performs specific financial reporting and grant work, respectively. Internal control material weaknesses
over both financial statements and major programs are relatively infrequent, occurring in approximately 3%-4%
of observations and average federal grant funding is approximately $85m. The average endowment value is over
$1.1bn and total enrollment is approximately 15,500 students. A minority of institutions are public (41%), 51%
offer doctoral degrees and 23% are colleges (as opposed to universities). 76% of the sample has a formal AC and
83% of audits are designated as low risk.

Table 2, Panel B is partitioned based on the existence of an IAF, and highlights that the two subsamples are
statistically different across most elements included in our analysis. Table 3 provides pairwise correlations and
provides univariate evidence that IAFs are associated with higher grant funding. While several independent
variables are moderately correlated (primarily among the different measures of size), an examination of
variance inflation factors highlights no values above 5, which limits the impact of multi-collinearity on our results
described below (Kennedy, 2003).
We summarize the results of our determinants model in Table 4. The findings suggest that institutions with
larger endowments and higher total enrollments are more likely to maintain an IAF (Endowment = 0.23; zstatistic = 1.92; Total enrollment = 0.67; z-statistic = 2.43), possibly because they have more financial resources
at stake. Furthermore, institutions that are publicly funded (Public = 1.58; z-statistic = 2.99) and that maintain
and AC (Audit committee = 1.48; z-statistic = 4.52) are also more likely to maintain IAFs. One interpretation of
these results is that accountability to the public and increased complexity and/or reliance on external grant
funding prompt additional governance mechanisms.
We present our results for tests of H1 regarding internal control material weaknesses in Table 5. The results
presented in Columns 1 through 3 suggest no statistical association between the presence of IAFs and material
weaknesses over financial statements. However, the results in Column 4 imply that institutions that maintain
IAFs are less likely to disclose an internal control material weakness over major programs (IAF = −0.77; z-statistic
= −2.30), which prompts us to reject the null hypothesis that IAFs and internal control material weaknesses are
independent. One possible interpretation of this result is that IAFs serve to strengthen oversight over major
programs in a way that reduces the likelihood of internal control problems.
The results in Columns 2 and 5 suggest that the presence of an IAF that is involved in financial work has no effect
on material weaknesses over financial statements or major programs. The results in Columns 3 and 6 include
both the presence of an IAF and if that IAF is involved in financial work. These results in Column 3 indicate no
statistical significance in the combined model between our independent variables for material weaknesses over
financial statements. The results in Column 6 remain significant for the presence of an IAF. These findings imply
no incremental impact on material weaknesses (financial statements or major programs) from IAFs specifically
identifying financial work, which supports the conclusion that merely the presence of an IAF is sufficient to elicit
the improvement in oversight over major programs.
In terms of control variables, Low risk audit is associated with fewer material weaknesses over both financial
statements and major programs in all models. Deficit is positively associated with material weaknesses over
financial reporting in all models, and negatively associated with material weaknesses over major programs in
one model. Big4 auditor is negatively associated with material weaknesses over financial controls in all models,
which is consistent with prior corporate literature (Rice and Weber, 2012). Finally, Public is significantly
associated with more material weaknesses over major programs in all models, possibly because of the increased
complexity of operations.
We present our results for tests of H2 regarding federal grant funding in Table 6. The findings in Column 1
suggest that institutions maintaining IAFs receive higher levels of federal grants (IAF = 0.28; t-statistic = 2.54)
after controlling for other factors influencing funding decisions, consistent with our predictions. As IAFs are
often asked to meet with some larger grant providers to opine on the control environment, we take this finding
as evidence suggesting that granting agencies view the presence of an IAF as a positive factor when making
funding decisions, possibly because of higher levels of compliance with proposal guidelines. Column 2 presents
results when we consider if the IAF does work specific to grants (IAF grant work = 0.25; t-statistic = 2.52), and
implies that procedures tailored to grants influences outcomes. Column 3 presents findings from our combined

model where we include both the presence of an IAF and if the IAF performs grant work. IAF grant work remains
significant (IAF grant work = 0.18; t-statistic = 1.71), although only at the 10% level.
The results in Table 6, Column 4 include lagged material weaknesses over programs, and highlight a negative
association with grant funding (MW Programt-1 = 0.32; t-statistic = −2.96). One possible interpretation of this
finding is that granting agencies use internal control results when making funding decisions, and suggests that
the IAF effect on grants could be because of higher evaluations of stewardship. Finally, we use data from the
USA Patent and Trademark Office from 2004 to 2012 to create a patent-based measure of research productivity
[15]. Specifically, we use the ratio of patents awarded to the university divided by the number of instructional
faculty. Our results with the inclusion of this variable in Column 5 suggests a positive association with grant
funding (Patent activity = 19.77; t-statistic = 3.82), but no impact the coefficient on IAF.
While we understand that we cannot definitively state the direction of relationships between IAFs and grant
activity, discussions with chief audit executives (CAEs) and these results further illustrate the important role IAFs
play in the grant processes, and support the conclusion that IAFs facilitate structures that ensure grant
applications cover all necessary administrative bases and/or granting agencies gain increased comfort awarding
monies to entities that have internal audit oversight. For other variables, Endowment size, Total enrollment,
Graduate percentage, Public, Hospital and Deficit, are all associated with greater levels of grant funding in all
models, likely because of an emphasis on research activity.
We also performed a set of additional untabulated tests to evaluate the robustness of our results. First, we
performed our internal control weakness analyzes based on equation (2) using an indicator only denoting
significant deficiencies and an internal control index capturing severity (Lopez and Peters, 2010) as the
dependent variable [16]. Findings on IAF were similar in terms of internal controls over both financial reporting
and major programs to those presented in Table 5, although the negative coefficient on IAF in the major
programs specification were only significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, we also included state fixed effects
in analyzes based on equation (2) and noted similar results to those in Table 5. Finally, we re-performed our
federal grants test based on equation (3) using federal grants per undergraduate student to further control for
institution size, and noted very similar results to those presented in Table 6.

Summary and conclusions
Using a unique hand-collected data set we examine the correlates and consequences of IAFs at US institutions of
higher education. Our findings suggest that IAFs are more likely at institutions with more students and large
endowments, those that are public and those that maintain an AC. This may suggest that complex institutions
that have more resources and rely on public funding use IAFs as an important governance mechanism to provide
oversight over resources. Furthermore, we find that the presence of IAFs within US institution of higher
education is associated with significantly fewer internal control material weaknesses over major programs.
Finally, we find that bot the presence of IAFs and IAFs involved within the grant process are associated with
greater levels of federal grant funding. We interpret these findings to imply that IAFs are associated with
improved processes related to federal funding, which should translate into greater levels of compliance with
grant regulations and provide comfort to granting agencies about stewardship over resources.
Future research opportunities are available due to the limitations of the current study. First, this study focuses
only on a subsample of the largest US colleges and universities, and thus, our results may not be generalizable to
the entire population of US colleges and universities. Future research may consider other types of institutions of
higher learning, alternate types of organizations, such as not-for-profit organizations and state governments or
examine similar organizations in other countries. Second, results indicate correlation and not causality and there
may be omitted variables in our models. Future studies using the case study approach and/or experiments may

be useful to further investigate the impact of IAFs within colleges and universities. Finally, our study does not
consider the effect of IAF quality on our hypothesized dependent variables. One potential avenue for future
research involves the examination of IAF quality and its effects on financial reporting quality and grants.
Limitations aside, we interpret our results to suggest that IAFs are increasingly important within US institutions
of higher education. First, our results indicate that IAFs serve to improve financial reporting systems, both by
promoting transparency and by improving internal controls over and above what ACs can do without IAFs.
Second, IAFs help provide confidence to granting agencies making allocation decisions, either directly through
grant work or indirectly by improving internal controls within their institutions. These findings should be of use
to college/university administrators looking to improve financial reporting transparency and effectively compete
for research dollars, by illustrating the incremental benefits that IAFs add to what ACs and external auditors
contribute. We also help the profession (The IIA) promote their constituency in the public sector and higher
educational settings. Finally, we inform external stakeholders looking to assess higher education institutional
performance.
Table 1. Sample selection
Colleges/Universities
Top 250 colleges and universities by endowment or
enrollment
Potential observations from 2004-2017 (400 × 14)
Less those with missing IPEDS records
Less those with missing federal audit clearinghouse details
Less those with missing federal grant details
Less those with missing debt or endowment details
Less those with missing determinants model observations
Final sample

Internal control
sample
400

Federal grants
sample
400

5,600
(30)
(1,914)
−
(111)
(112)
3.433

5,600
(30)
−
(46)
(180)
(392)
4,952

Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable
Panel A: full sample (n = 3,433)
IAF
IAF financial work
IAF grant work
MW
MW program
Federal grants (‘000 s)
Endowment (‘000 s)
Total enrollment
Graduate percentage
Public
College
Doctoral
Masters
Land grant
Religious
Urban
Hospital
Audit committee
Debt ratio
Deficit
Big4 auditor
Low risk audit
Panel B: Sorted by IAF (n = 3,433)
Variable
MW
MW program
Federal grants (‘000 s)
Endowment (‘000 s)
Total enrollment
Graduate percentage
Public
College

IAF = 1
Mean
0.03
0.04
117,595
1,453,781
19,451
0.26
0.50
0.11

Mean

P25

Median

P75

SD

0.67
0.45
0.37
0.03
0.04
84,964
1,148,228
15,558
0.22
0.41
0.23
0.51
0.22
0.07
0.19
0.63
0.10
0.76
0.36
0.23
0.63
0.83

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2,982
109,656
3,508
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
1.00

1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
23,576
33,182
13,631
0.21
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.31
0.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
72,952
817,324
23,063
0.31
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.43
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.47
0.50
0.48
0.16
0.20
164,111
3,159,642
12,762
0.16
0.49
0.42
0.50
0.41
0.26
0.39
0.48
0.30
0.43
0.22
0.42
0.48
0.38

Median

SD

0.00
0.00
40,834
333,799
17,574
0.23
1.00
0.00

0.16
0.19
188,652
3,793,383
12,844
0.16
0.50
0.31

IAF = 0
Mean
0.03
0.04
17,059
541,638
7,830
0.14
0.21
0.46

Median

SD

Test of Mean Diff

0.00
0.00
2,491
330,648
3,272
0.08
0.00
1.00

0.17
0.20
58,709
828,714
8,303
0.15
0.41
0.50

***
***
***
***
***
***

Doctoral
0.65
1.00
0.48
0.23
0.00
0.42
***
Masters
0.21
0.00
0.41
0.22
0.00
0.42
Land grant
0.10
0.00
0.30
0.03
0.00
0.16
***
Religious
0.15
0.00
0.36
0.27
0.00
0.45
***
Urban
0.70
1.00
0.46
0.48
0.00
0.50
***
Hospital
0.13
0.00
0.34
0.04
0.00
0.19
***
Audit committee
0.85
1.00
0.36
0.58
1.00
0.49
***
Debt ratio
0.40
0.35
0.23
0.28
0.25
0.17
***
Deficit
0.24
0.00
0.43
0.21
0.00
0.41
*
Big4 auditor
0.66
1.00
0.47
0.57
0.00
0.50
***
Low risk audit
0.82
1.00
0.39
0.85
1.00
0.35
***
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for all variables included in the study. Panel A is for the entire sample, while Panel B divides the sample
into two subsamples based on institutions with and without IAFs.
*,
**,
***indicate significance at p < 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 in tests of mean differences between the two subsamples. Variable descriptions are as stated in
the Appendix, except for federal grants, endowment and total enrollment, which are reported at raw values
Table 3. Pairwise correlations
Variable
[1] IAF
[2] IAF
financial
work
[3] IAF grant
work
[4] MW
[5] MW
program
[6] Federal
grants
[7]
Endowment
[8] Total
enrollment
[9] Graduate
percentage

[1]
1.00
0.66*

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

0.55*

0.67*

1.00

0.00
0.00

0.01
0.05*

0.23*

[6]

[7]

[8]

−0.04*
0.00

1.00
0.17*

1.00

0.31*

0.29*

0.00

−0.02

1.00

0.08*

0.08*

0.16*

−0.03*

−0.05*

0.53*

1.00

0.37*

0.41*

0.39*

0.01

0.08*

0.44*

0.07*

1.00

0.24*

0.28*

0.19*

−0.01

0.02

0.46*

0.32*

0.18*

[9]

1.00

1.00

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[10] Public
[11] College
[12] Doctoral
[13] Masters
[14] Land
grant
[15] Religious
[16] Urban
[17] Hospital
[18] Audit
committee
[19] Debt
ratio
[20] Deficit
[21] Big4
auditor
[22] Low risk
audit

0.31*
−0.37*
0.34*
−0.03*
0.13*

0.38*
−0.38*
0.38*
−0.06*
0.15*

0.30*
−0.31*
0.35*
−0.06*
0.17*

0.01
0.02
0.02
−0.05*
0.00

0.11*
−0.07*
0.07*
−0.03
0.06*

0.05*
−0.24*
0.41*
−0.24*
0.21*

−0.24*
−0.04*
0.18*
−0.16*
−0.02

0.55*
−0.48*
0.56*
−0.09*
0.35*

−0.04*
−0.43*
0.42*
−0.17*
0.00

1.00
−0.44*
0.21*
0.20*
0.28*

1.00
−0.46*
−0.13*
−0.17*

1.00
−0.61*
0.32*

1.00
−0.19*

1.00

−0.17*
0.16*
0.12*
0.29*

−0.17*
0.16*
0.17*
0.27*

−0.14*
0.11*
0.13*
0.20*

−0.02
−0.05*
0.07*
−0.03

−0.04*
0.03
0.09*
0.00

−0.15*
0.19*
0.39*
0.11*

−0.01
0.03*
0.13*
0.08*

−0.25*
0.23*
0.16*
0.09*

0.07*
0.25*
0.32*
0.08*

−0.45*
0.06*
0.04*
0.02

0.10*
−0.25*
−0.15*
−0.03*

−0.05*
0.19*
0.18*
0.04*

−0.02
−0.01
−0.17*
−0.02

−0.15*
0.00
0.02
−0.02

1.00
0.02
−0.04*
−0.07*

1.00
0.13*
0.07*

0.20*

0.11*

0.08*

0.01

0.02

−0.02

−0.14*

0.25*

0.05*

0.36*

−0.26*

0.07*

0.25*

0.02

−0.16*

0.09*

0.00
0.11*

−0.05*
0.07*

−0.04*
0.19*

0.05*
−0.11*

−0.03
−0.01

−0.05*
0.18*

−0.01
0.18*

−0.11*
0.03*

−0.04*
0.23*

−0.09*
−0.23*

0.09*
−0.11*

−0.10*
0.10*

0.05*
−0.05*

−0.07*
0.00

0.03*
0.05*

−0.03*
0.26*

−0.05*

−0.08*

−0.03*

−0.14*

−0.24*

0.05*

0.08*

−0.11*

0.01

−0.14*

0.06*

−0.03

−0.02

−0.04*

0.03

−0.03

[17] Hospital
[18] Audit committee
[19] Debt ratio
[20] Deficit
[21] Big4 auditor
[22] Low risk audit

[17]
1.00
0.03*
0.03
−0.02
0.12*
−0.05*

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

1.00
0.09*
0.06*
0.09*
0.00

1.00
0.20*
0.03
0.02

1.00
0.00
−0.01

1.00
0.09*

1.00

Notes:
This table provides pairwise correlations for the variables in our study.
*denotes significance at the 5% level. Variable descriptions are included in the Appendix
Table 4. Determinants of internal audit functions in higher education
Endowment
0.23* (1.92)
Total enrollment
0.67** (2.43)
Graduate percentage 1.18 (1.09)
Public
1.58*** (2.99)
College
−0.11 (−0.23)
Doctoral
0.74 (1.17)
Masters
0.19 (0.37)

Land grant
−0.09 (−0.17)
Religious
−0.36 (−0.73)
Urban
0.13 (0.50)
Hospital
0.66 (1.22)
Audit committee
1.48*** (4.52)
Constant
4.07 (1.19)
Observations
5,093
Pseudo R2
0.40
Notes:
***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05;
*p < 0.1 based on two-tailed tests. Robust z-statistics in parentheses, with standard errors clustered on institution following procedures outlined by
Rogers (1993). Year and state fixed effects are included but not reported. This table presents results from a logit specification of a determinants model of
IAF existence based on equation (1). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one (0 otherwise) for institutions of higher learning that
maintain a distinct IAF. Variable descriptions are in the Appendix
Table 5. the Relation between internal audit functions and material weaknesses in higher education
MW financial statements
MW major programs
Variable
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
IAF
0.12 (0.40)
0.11 (0.32)
−0.77** (−2.30)
IAF financial work
0.10 (0.32)
0.02 (0.07)
Endowment
0.09 (0.59)
0.05 (0.36)
0.09 (0.59)
−0.10 (−0.99)
Total enrollment
−0.32 (−1.36)
−0.42* (−1.84)
−0.32 (−1.37)
−0.18 (−0.79)
Graduate percentage 1.00 (1.14)
0.77 (0.83)
0.99 (1.13)
1.18 (1.16)
Public
0.74 (1.50)
0.63 (1.28)
0.74 (1.50)
1.59*** (3.50)
Doctoral
0.57 (1.58)
0.45 (1.23)
0.57 (1.57)
0.49 (1.30)
Hospital
0.61 (1.17)
0.67 (1.18)
0.60 (1.11)
0.56 (1.29)
Audit committee
0.00 (0.02)
−0.19 (−0.60)
−0.00 (−0.00)
0.39 (0.85)
Debt ratio
0.50 (0.66)
0.41 (0.54)
0.51 (0.66)
−1.06 (−1.30)
Deficit
0.69** (2.40)
0.69** (2.43)
0.69** (2.40)
−0.55 (−1.57)
Big4 auditor
−1.26*** (−5.29)
−1.24*** (−5.18) −1.26*** (−5.28) 0.28 (0.91)
Low risk audit
−1.23*** (−4.24)
−1.20*** (−4.13) −1.23*** (−4.23) −1.77*** (−7.29)
Lambda
0.66** (2.46)
0.15 (0.76)
0.66** (2.45)
−0.09 (−0.19)
Constant
−3.78 (−0.96)
−1.63 (−0.43)
−3.76 (−0.97)
−1.09 (−0.35)
Observations
3,433
3,433
3,433
3,433

[5]

[6]
−1.08*** (−2.66)
−0.19 (−0.45)
0.41 (0.94)
−0.13 (−1.14)
−0.10 (−0.91)
−0.20 (−0.94)
−0.17 (−0.76)
1.35 (1.40)
1.04 (0.98)
1.58*** (3.39)
1.54*** (3.24)
0.55 (1.41)
0.48 (1.28)
0.62 (1.33)
0.54 (1.24)
0.44 (1.11)
0.35 (0.72)
−1.10 (−1.34)
−1.02 (−1.20)
−0.59* (−1.69)
−0.55 (−1.56)
0.34 (1.02)
0.27 (0.89)
−1.79*** (−7.59) −1.76*** (−7.40)
0.15 (1.27)
−0.09 (−0.19)
−1.12 (−0.38)
−1.20 (−0.39)
3,433
3,433

Pseudo R2
0.13
0.12
0.13
0.20
0.20
0.20
Notes:
***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05;
*p < 0.1 based on two-tailed tests. Robust z-statistics in parentheses, with standard errors clustered on institution following procedures outlined by
Rogers (1993). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. This table presents results from logit specifications of internal control material
weaknesses based on equation (2). The dependent variable in columns [1] through [3] is an indicator variable equal to one (0 otherwise) for audit years
with material weaknesses related to the financial statements, and an indicator variable equal to one (0 otherwise) for audit years with material
weaknesses related to major programs in Columns [4] through [6]. Variable descriptions are in the Appendix
Table 6. the Relation between internal audit functions and federal grants in higher education
Variable
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
IAF
0.28** (2.54)
0.19 (1.62)
0.33** (2.57)
0.26** (2.56)
IAF grant work
0.25** (2.52)
0.18* (1.71)
Endowment
0.35*** (11.39) 0.34*** (11.42) 0.34*** (11.44) 0.39*** (9.12)
0.30*** (9.45)
Total enrollment
0.75*** (7.47) 0.73*** (7.16) 0.73*** (7.21) 0.71*** (4.95)
0.81*** (9.32)
Graduate percentage 2.68*** (5.92) 2.70*** (5.96) 2.68*** (5.95) 2.63*** (4.47)
2.49*** (5.52)
Public
1.13*** (5.93) 1.12*** (5.76) 1.11*** (5.79) 1.20*** (4.50)
0.92*** (5.01)
Doctoral
0.20 (1.43)
0.18 (1.23)
0.18 (1.24)
0.32* (1.72)
0.014 (0.11)
Hospital
0.70*** (4.91) 0.70*** (4.81) 0.70*** (4.86) 0.66*** (3.65)
0.76*** (5.19)
Audit committee
−0.07 (−0.68)
−0.10 (−0.89)
−0.10 (−0.94)
−0.10 (−0.58)
−0.17 (−1.62)
Debt ratio
0.21 (0.96)
0.26 (1.18)
0.24 (1.09)
0.38 (1.32)
−0.05 (−0.19)
Deficit
0.12*** (2.86) 0.12*** (2.87) 0.12*** (2.76) 0.09* (1.92)
0.15*** (2.79)
MW programt-1
−0.32*** (−2.96)
Patent activity
19.77*** (3.82)
Lambda
−0.39* (−1.75) −0.48** (−2.14) −0.42* (−1.88) −0.32 (−1.06)
−0.54** (−2.21)
Constant
1.98** (2.03)
2.50** (2.53)
2.32** (2.38)
0.72 (0.53)
2.52** (2.57)
Observations
4,952
4,952
4,952
3,409
2,654
2
Pseudo R
0.82
0.82
0.82
0.81
0.84
Notes:
***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05; and
*p < 0.1 based on two-tailed tests. Robust z-statistics in parentheses, with standard errors clustered on institution following procedures outlined by
Rogers (1993). Year and state fixed effects are included but not reported. This table presents results from OLS specifications of logged federal grants
based on equation (3). The dependent variable is the log of federal grants received by a given institution. Variable descriptions are in the Appendix

Table A1. Variable definitions
Variable
Definition
MW
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for audit years with a
material weakness related to the financial statements
MW program
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for audit years with a
material weakness related to major programs
Federal grants
Amount of federal grants received by the institution
IAF
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions that
maintain a distinct internal audit function (IAF)
IAF financial
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions where the
work
IAF conducts financial work
IAF grant work
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions where the
IAF conducts grant work
Audit
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions that
committee
maintain an audit committee (AC)
Endowment
Year-end value of institution’s endowment
Total
12-month total enrollment
enrollment
Graduate
Fraction of 12-month total enrollment that are graduate students
percentage
Public
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions that are
publicly administered
College
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions that are
classified as colleges (i.e. units are not organized into separate
colleges)
Doctoral
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions where the
highest degree awarded is a doctorate
Masters
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions where the
highest degree awarded is a masters
Land grant
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for land grant institutions
Urban
Hospital

Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions with a city
(11, 12 or 13) locale code
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions that
maintain a hospital

Source
Audit analytics

IPEDS public (F1A)/private (F2) institutions finance table
Manually collected from institution website and/or e-mail
or phone correspondence with institution

IPEDS public (F1A)/private (F2) institutions finance table
IPEDS 12-month enrollment (EFFY) table

IPEDS public (F1A) institutions finance table
Manually collected
Carnegie classification of institutions of higher education

IPEDS institutional characteristics – directory information
(HD) table

Religious
Debt ratio
Deficit
Big4 auditor
Low risk audit
Patent activity

Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions with a
religious affiliation
The ratio of debt to total assets
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions with a
change in net assets less than 0
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for institutions that use a
Big 4 auditor
Indicator variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for audit years that are
designated as low risk
Number of patents received by institution divided by number of
instructional faculty

IPEDS institutional characteristics – educational offerings,
organization, services and athletic associations (IC) table
IPEDS public (F1A)/private (F2) institutions finance table
IPEDS public (F1A)/private (F2) institutions finance table
Audit analytics

US patent and trademark office

Notes
1. See www.protiviti.com/US-en/internal-audit-and-financial-advisory
2. See www.boston-consortium.org/shared_resources/internal_audit.asp
3. There are many federal funding agencies that fund research, education, training, travel and other areas of
scholarship. Some examples include: The National Institutes of Health, The National Science Foundation,
The Department of Defense, The Department of Education, The National Endowment for the Arts and
the National Endowment for the Humanities. See www.grants.gov for a more comprehensive list.
4. To the authors’ knowledge, no regulation exists that requires the existence of an IAF within institutions of
higher education that receive federal grant monies.
5. The authors use an index of the extent of SEA reporting with 14 total categories including enrollment
statistics, persistence and graduation outcomes, graduation statistics, quality of educational experience
indicators, efficiency or comparative financial data/ratios, diversity measures, student satisfaction or
graduating senior survey, selectivity. measures, student outcome measures, quality of faculty indicators,
faculty/staff morale and salary studies, nationally recognized exam performance, alumni/employer
survey results and “other.” Tuition cost and financial aid, endowment performance and various financial
ratios were among the categories listed under “other indicators.”
6. The threshold has increased over time from an initial cutoff of $300,000 to $750,000 (OMB 2014a).
7. Per the GAO (2011): “a deficiency in internal control exists when the design or operation of a control does not
allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to
prevent or detect and correct, misstatements on a timely basis. A material weakness is a deficiency or a
combination of deficiencies, in internal control, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material
misstatement of the entity’s financial statements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a
timely basis. A significant deficiency is a deficiency or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control
that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those charged
with governance.”
8. Prawitt et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between IAF quality and financial reporting quality (abnormal
accruals and the likelihood of just beating or meeting analyst forecast) in publicly traded firms. Lin et
al. (2011) find a negative relationship between IAF quality disclosed material weaknesses. Ege
(2015) finds a negative association between a composite measure of IAF quality (internal auditor
competence, independence/objectivity, IAF financial work and size) and management misconduct
(financial reporting fraud, bribery and misleading disclosure practices).
9. Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) requires that the management of public companies assess the
effectiveness of the internal controls over financial reporting and that registered public accounting firm
that issues the audit report therein attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management
of the issuer (U.S. Congress, 2002). As SOX was enacted, management for these companies have relied
largely on internal auditors to ensure proper controls are in place to comply with this regulation.
Therefore, IAFs in publicly traded companies are likely more mature and advanced than their
counterparts in colleges/universities.
10. The information in this paragraph is largely based on conversations the researchers had with CAEs of a large
private college/university, a public statewide university system and a small private college/university.
11. Additional reports can be found on the NSF-OIG website https://www.nsf.gov/oig/
12. We begin our analysis is 2004 due to coding/availability issues in the IPEDS data.
13. We do consider situations where an institution created an IAF during our sample period. Thus, an institution
may have some years during our sample period where it does not maintain an IAF, and others where it
does maintain an IAF. For reference, 66 institutions created an IAF during our sample period.

14. Based on conversations with a few CAEs of colleges/universities in the northeast, there is no reason to
believe that IAF financial and grant work substantially differs between in-house and outsourced IAFs.
Additionally, only eight institutions in our sample indicated they had outsourced their IAF, thus there
were not enough cases to complete an analysis therein.
15. We do not include this in our primary model because are only available through 2012
from https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/org_gr/all_univ_ag.htm. The average
number of patents is just under 8, although there is significant variation with a standard deviation of
about 25.
16. More specifically, we use a value of 2 for material weaknesses, 1 for significant deficiencies and 0 for no
internal control weaknesses in an ordered logit specification.

References

Abdolmohammadi, M.J., Burnaby, P. and Hass, S. (2006), “The Americas literature review on internal
auditing”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21 No. 8, pp. 835-844.
Ali, M.M., Bhattacharyya, P. and Olejniczak, A.J. (2010), “The effects of scholarly productivity and institutional
characteristics on the distribution of Federal Research Grants”, The Journal of Higher Education,
Vol. 81 No. 2, pp. 164-178.
Anderson, U.L., Christ, M.H., Johnstone, K.M. and Rittenberg, L. (2010), “Effective Sizing of Internal Audit
Activities for Colleges and Universities”, Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation.
Anderson, U.L., Christ, M.H., Johnstone, K.M. and Rittenberg, L.E. (2012), “A post-SOX examination of factors
associated with the size of IAFs”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 167-191.
Archambeault, D.S., DeZoort, F.T. and Holt, T.P. (2008), “The need for an internal auditor report to external
stakeholders to improve governance transparency”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 375-388.
Arena, M. (2013), “Internal audit in Italian universities: an empirical study”, Procedia – Social and Behavioral
Sciences, Vol. 93, pp. 2000-2005.
Behn, B.K., DeVries, D.D. and Lin, J. (2010), “The determinants of transparency in nonprofit organizations: an
exploratory study”, Advances in Accounting, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 6-12.
Blackmore, J.A. (2004), “A critical evaluation of academic internal audit”, Quality Assurance in Education,
Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 128-135.
Bou-Raad, G. (2000), “Internal auditors and a value-added approach: the new business regime”, Managerial
Auditing Journal, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 182-187.
Christopher, J. (2012a), “The adoption of internal audit as a governance control mechanism in australian public
universities – views from the CEOs”, Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, Vol. 34 No. 5,
pp. 529-541.
Christopher, J. (2012b), “Governance paradigms of public universities: an international comparative
study”, Tertiary Education and Management, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 335-351.
Christopher, J. (2015), “Internal audit: Does it enhance governance in the Australian public university
sector?”, Educational Management Administration and Leadership, Vol. 43 No. 6, pp. 954-971.
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G. and Wright, A. (2004), “The corporate governance mosaic and financial reporting
quality”, Journal of Accounting Literature, pp. 87-152.
Coupland, D. (1993), “The internal auditor’s role in public service orientation”, Managerial Auditing Journal,
Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 3-13.
DeSimone, S.M. (2020), “Internal audit and financial reporting quality in the public sector”, Working Paper.
Dundar, H. and Lewis, D.R. (1998), “Determinants of research productivity in higher education”, Research in
Higher Education, Vol. 39 No. 6, pp. 607-631.

Ege, M.S. (2015), “Does IAF quality deter management misconduct?”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 90 No. 2,
pp. 495-497.
Evans, S. and Roy, R. (2012), “Internal control issues concerning grant awards”, Briefing, University System of
Georgia Office of Internal Audit and Compliance (USGOIAC), Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 7-9, available
at: www.usg.edu/assets/audit/documents/Briefing_Fall_2012_-_Final.pdf
Gordon, G. and Fischer, M. (1996), “Internal auditing in colleges and universities: utilization and
independence”, Internal Auditing, Winter, pp. 52-58.
Gordon, T.P. and Fischer, M. (2008), “Communicating performance: the extent and effectiveness of performance
reporting by US colleges and universities”, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial
Management, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 217-255.
Gordon, T., Fischer, M., Malone, D. and Tower, G. (2002), “A comparative empirical examination of extent of
disclosure by private and public colleges and universities in the United States”, Journal of Accounting and
Public Policy, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 235-275.
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) (2008), “GFOA recommended practice on audit
committees”, available at: www.gfoa.org/audit-committees
Gramling, A.A., Maletta, M.J., Schneider, A. and Church, B.K. (2004), “The role of the IAF in corporate
governance: a synthesis of the extant internal auditing literature and directions for future
research”, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 23, pp. 194-244.
Heckman, J. (1979), “Sample selection bias as a specification error”, Econometrica, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 153-161.
Howard, D. and Laird, F. (2013), “The new normal in funding university science”, Issues in Science and
Technology, Vol. 30, pp. 71-76.
Kennedy, P. (2003), A Guide to Econometrics, 5th edition. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Kezar, A. (2005), “Consequences of radical change in governance: a grounded theory approach”, The Journal of
Higher Education, Vol. 76 No. 6, pp. 634-668.
Kezar, A. and Eckel, P.D. (2004), “Meeting today’s governance challenges: a synthesis of the literature and
examination of a future agenda for scholarship”, The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 75 No. 4, pp. 371399.
Lin, S., Pizzini, M., Vargus, M. and Bardhan, I.R. (2011), “The role of the IAF in the disclosure of material
weaknesses”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 86 No. 1, pp. 287-323.
Lopez, D.M. and Peters, G.F. (2010), “Internal control reporting differences among public and governmental
auditors: the case of city and county circular A-133 audits”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
Vol. 29 No. 5, pp. 481-502.
Lundquist, R. (1997), “Quality in higher education: approaches to its management and improvement”, Doctoral
Thesis, Division of Quality Technology and Statistics, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden.
Magoc, E. (2015), “University of Florida agrees to $19.8M federal settlement”, Health News Florida, November
20, https://health.wusf.usf.edu/post/university-florida-agrees-198m-federal-settlement#stream/0
Mihret, D.G. and Yismaw, A.W. (2007), “Internal audit effectiveness: an Ethiopian public sector case
study”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 22 No. 5, pp. 470-484.
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities Office of Internal Auditing (2016), “Grant management: internal
control and compliance audit”, available at: https://minnstate.edu/system/ia/reports/2015-grantsmanagement.pdf
Mock, G. (2002), “Auditing federal grants”, Duke Today, November 2, available
at: https://today.duke.edu/2010/11/grantaudits.html
Montondon, L.G. and Fischer, M. (1999), “University audit departments in the United States”, Financial
Accountability and Management, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 85-94.
Nagy, A.L. and Cenker, W.J. (2002), “An assessment of the newly defined IAF”, Managerial Auditing Journal,
Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 130-137.

National Science Foundation (NSF) (2017), Universities Report Increased Federal R&D Funding after 4-Year
Decline; R&D Fields Revised for FY 2016, InfoBrief, National Center for Science and Engineering
Statistics, available at: www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsf18303/nsf18303.pdf
National Science Foundation (NSF) (2019), “Proposal and award policies and procedures guide”, VA., available
at: www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappg19_1/nsf19_1.pdf
National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General (NSF-OIG) (2016), “NSF office of inspector general
semiannual report to congress”, available at: www.nsf.gov/pubs/2017/oig17001/oig17001.pdf
National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General (NSF-OIG) (2009a), “Audit of effort reporting system –
Cornell university”, available at: www.nsf.gov/oig/_pdf/09_1_008_cornell.pdf
National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General (NSF-OIG) (2009b), “Audit of effort reporting system –
university of Madison-Wisconsin”, available at: www.nsf.gov/oig/_pdf/10_1_002_uwm.pdf
National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General (NSF-OIG) (2008), “Audit of effort reporting system –
Vanderbilt university”, available at: www.nsf.gov/oig/_pdf/08_1_014_Vanderbilt.pdf
National Science Foundation Office of Inspector General (NSF-OIG) (2006), “Audit of effort reporting system –
university of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign”, available at: www.nsf.gov/oig/_pdf/08_1_005_illinois.pdf
Ntim, C.G., Soobaroyen, T. and Broad, M.J. (2017), “Governance structures, voluntary disclosures and public
accountability: the case of UK higher education institutions”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 65-118.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (2003), Circular No. A-133: Audits of States, Local Governments, and
Non-Profit Organizations, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (2014a), “Uniform administrative requirements, costs, and audit
requirements for federal awards”, Title 2 C.F.R. §200.0, available at: www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=ce4e1f0986e67c291f77699536ebb117andmc=trueandnode=pt2.1.200andrgn=div5#sp2.1.200.b
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (2014b), “Criteria for a low-risk auditee”, Title 2 C.F.R.
§200.520, available at: www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR-2014-title2-vol1/CFR-2014-title2-vol1-sec200520
Parker, L. (2011), “University corporatization: driving redefinition”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 434-450.
Payne, A.A. (2001), “Measuring the effect of federal research funding on private donations at research
universities: is federal research funding more than a substitute for private donations?”, International Tax
and Public Finance, Vol. 8, pp. 731-751.
Peterson, A.N. (2014), “The Impact of Municipal Governance on Cities’ Audit Outcomes”, Working Paper, East
Carolina University.
Petrovits, C., Shakespeare, C. and Shih, A. (2011), “The causes and consequences of internal control problems in
nonprofit organizations”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 86 No. 1, pp. 325-357.
Prawitt, D.F., Smith, J.L. and Wood, D.A. (2009), “Internal audit quality and earnings management”, The
Accounting Review, Vol. 84 No. 4, pp. 1255-1280.
Rice, S.C. and Weber, D.P. (2012), “How effective is internal control reporting under SOX 404? Determinants of
the (non-) disclosure of existing material weaknesses”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 50 No. 3,
pp. 811-844.
Rogers, W. (1993), “Regression standard errors in clustered samples”, Stata Technical Bulletin, Vol. 3 No. 13,
pp. 19-23.
Sarens, G. and Abdolmohammadi, M.J. (2011), “Monitoring effects of the internal audit function: agency theory
versus other explanatory variables”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 1-20.
Sari, N., Ghozali, I. and Achmad, T. (2017), “The effect of internal audit and internal control system on public
accountability: the empirical study in Indonesia state universities”, International Journal of Civil
Engineering and Technology, Vol. 8 No. 9, pp. 157-166.

The Institute of Internal Auditors (1999), A Vision for the Future: Professional Practices Framework for Internal
Auditing, The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
The Institute of Internal Auditors (2009), Internal Audit Capability Model (IA-CM) for the Public Sector, The
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL, available
at: https://na.theiia.org/iiarf/Public%20Documents/Internal%20Audit%20Capability%20Model%20IACM%20for%20the%20Public%20Sector%20Overview.pdf
The Institute of Internal Auditors (2012), The Role of Auditing in Public Sector Governance, Altamonte Springs,
FL., available at: http://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/Public%20Documents/Public_Sector_Governance1_1_.pdf
The Institute of Internal Auditors (2013), Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards);
IPPF 1312 - External Assessments, Almonte Springs, FL., available at: https://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/Public%20Documents/IPPF%202013%20English.pdf
University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) Institutional Audit Office (2016), “Contracts and grants billing
audit”, available
at: www.utsystem.edu/sites/default/files/documents/UTEP%20Contracts%20and%20Grants%20Billing%
20Report/utep-contracts-and-grants-billing-report.pdf
United States Congress (1984), “Single audit act of 1984”, PUBLIC LAW 98-502, available
at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg2327.pdf
United States Congress (1996), “Single audit act amendments of 1996”, PUBLIC LAW 104–156, available
at: www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/about_omb/104-156.pdf
United States Congress (2002), Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204, Washington, DC., Government
Printing Office.
United States Department of Justice (US DOJ) (2015), University of FL Agrees to Pay $19.875 Million to Settle
False Claims Act Allegations, Washington, DC, Press release 15-1443, available
at: www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-florida-agrees-pay-19875-million-settle-false-claims-actallegations
United States Governmental Accountability Office (US GAO) (2011), “Government accounting
standards”, available at: www.gao.gov/yellowbook/overview
University of Washington Department of Audits (2007), “Report of internal audit results 2006”, available
at: www.washington.edu/regents/meetings/meetings07/march/items/fin/f-10.pdf
van Gils, D. (2012), “The development of internal auditing within Belgian public entities: a neo-institutional and
new public management perspective”, Université Catholique de Louvain.
Zakaria, Z., Selvaraj, S.D. and Zakaria, Z. (2006), “Internal auditors: their role in the institutions of higher
education in Malaysia”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21 No. 9, pp. 892-904.

Further reading

Sawan, N. (2013), “The role of internal audit function in the public sector context in Saudi Arabia”, African Journal
of Business Management, Vol. 7 No. 6, pp. 443-454.

Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge participants at the 2019 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting
and the 2019 European Conference on Internal Audit & Corporate Governance for their helpful suggestions. The
authors also thank the following research assistants for their assistance and data collection efforts; Victor
Karalolos, Kyle Irvine, Samuel Phelan, and Jiehui Huang. The authors thank the following for grants that funded
this research; PricewaterhouseCoopers (INQuiries) and the College of the Holy Cross Batchelor-Ford Fellowship
Program.

